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Abstract 
This paper examines the capacity of the Chilean state to respond to the social impact of the 2010 
earthquake and tsunami. Decades of neoliberal policy have left Chile with a skeletal state, which 
administers social policy through targeting and a significant extent of outsourcing through 
public-private partnerships, which lack coordination. The reconstruction effort of the Chilean 
state largely responded to the emergency through these same principles. While official reports on 
the reconstruction effort show a state that is complying with its specified goals, evidence from 
qualitative fieldwork undertaken in the city of Constitución illustrates the extent to which this 
method proved to be highly inadequate in the context of a natural disaster. We conclude by 
arguing that Chile should establish a social policy structure for natural disasters that allows for a 
rapid response to a social emergency based on universal or near universal allocation criteria.  
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1. Introduction 
Most accounts of the Chilean earthquake of 2010 begin with an enumeration of the losses that it 
caused: the number of lives lost, the percentage of housing lost, and the economic cost of the 
earthquake (CEPAL 2010a; Gobierno de Chile 2011 y 2012; Larrañaga & Herrera, 2010). 
Analysts argue that Chile's material infrastructure withstood the earthquake so well because 
decades of work on building codes and their enforcement have led to earthquake safe 
constructions (Cámara Chilena de la Construcción, 2010; Bitar, 2010). In addition, experts 
highlight the rapid response of the Chilean government in reestablishing telecommunications 
services and road connectivity.  By comparison, the social consequences of the earthquake and 
the institutional response to them have been studied very little. 
During its history, Chile has experienced numerous socio-natural disasters. On many occasions, 
the processes of reconstruction that followed have provided a significant impetus for local 
development and for the establishment of social policies (Lawner, 2011). In fact, on previous 
occasions, the Chilean State improved its institutions and policies as a result (Arana, 2016). As 
Pelham, Clay and Braunholz (2011) argue, natural disasters must be considered in the context of 
the development process as a constituent part of it, and not as an exogenous event.  
It is extremely important to ask about the institutional response in the context of the fact that 
decades of neoliberal policy have left Chile with a skeletal state, which largely administers social 
policy through targeted and very narrowly focused social programmes (Borzutzky, 2002; 
Solimano, 2012; and Atria et al, 2013; Ilgü Özler, 2012). The State therefore addressed the social 
impact of 27F by applying regular social programs and policies. There is a consensus that 
considers that social policy in Chile is based on three central elements: the „selectivity and 
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targetting' of spending, the „privatization‟ of service provision, and the„decentralization‟ of the 
execution of social policy through municipal administrations (Taylor, 2003). 
Selectivity and targeting are based on the selection of beneficiaries according to “poverty 
criteria”. Until 2006, the national poverty line was used, which in that year was 13.8% of the 
population. After 2006, the targeted population was gradually increased to 20%, 40% or 60% 
depending on the policy.
1
 In this sense, the State has become a distributor of subsidies in 
different areas of social policy (health, education, employment or housing, for example). One 
central element in the case of natural disasters is that these affect both the poor (or vulnerable) as 
well as the non-poor (or non-vulnerable) population. Due to the targeting criteria, a significant 
proportion of the population is therefore excluded from potentially receiving benefits, although 
the housing of low-income households did suffer greater damage, because of the precarious 
quality of their houses and because of their location in risk areas (Larrañaga, O. & Herrera, R., 
2010).  Among the poorest quintile 12% of housing was severely damaged as opposed to the 
8.8% average for the affected regions. This situation is compounded by the fact that the same 
allocation criteria are also used for other benefits (such as income or child support), which may 
compound the exclusion of non-poor households from social policy. 
However, natural disasters also produce new vulnerabilities (Arteaga y Tapia, 2015). If standard 
allocation mechanisms are used, these therefore do not take these new vulnerabilities into 
account.  
This paper presents the hypothesis that the “real existing neoliberalism” (Brenner y Theodore, 
2002) in Chile, has generated a social policy system based on minimal targeted benefits, which 
in terms of its execution relies on various NGOs which operate in a decentralized and 
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uncoordinated way, and which  in turn limits the role of the state in a post-disaster emergency 
situation. Any change in this social policy model would have implied establishing a new balance 
between the State and private actors, an option which the Chilean government was always 
unlikely to countenance, especially in an emergency situation.  
The application of this model implied, first, a deficient register and diagnosis regarding the social 
impact of the catastrophe. Second, the institutions themselves proved to be vulnerable, applying 
a social policy with a low level of coordination, based on fragmented actions that, above all, do 
not adequately confront the new vulnerabilities that came out of the consequences of the disaster. 
In fact, institutional infrastructure and response mechanisms that cannot deal with the social 
emergencies of earthquakes and other natural disasters, can be just as devastating as the material 
damage caused by the disaster (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith, 2002). 
This paper is based on the review of academic and institutional literature on natural disasters and 
on the role of the Chilean State in the specific context of its social policy response. We relate this 
literature to the Chilean case and to the empirical evidence available on the impact of the 
earthquake and tsunami using data from the 2010 household survey, which was specifically 
designed to capture its impact. In addition, we relate it to the fieldwork that we undertook during 
2013 in the city of Constitución, a coastal city in the Maule region that was significantly affected 
by both the earthquake and tsunami, where we interviewed civil servants at all levels of the 
public administration (municipal, regional, and central government) who were involved in the 
distribution of social benefits to families affected by the earthquake as well as local residents, 
who were affected by the earthquake and therefore had to deal with the procedures through 
which benefits were allocated.
2
  This combination of interviews allowed us to gage the ability of 
the Chilean government to respond to the social emergency created by the disaster. 
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Our conclusions express that the pillars on which Chile's sociopolitical model is built are fragile 
in a post-disaster context. The way in which targeting, outsourcing and uncoordinated actions are 
carried out produces tensions and new inequalities in the affected territories. This is why we 
suggest mechanisms of universal or near universal allocation criteria and permanent coordination 
in circumstances of natural disasters, as does the international literature. 
However, before engaging with an analysis of these processes, we would like to emphasise that 
this article limits its analysis to the social policy response of the Chilean state to the emergency 
situation. Although we appreciate that the private sector (both in the form of private corporations and 
NGOs) played a significant role in the execution of the reconstruction process, they were not connected to 
the social policy infrastructure that managed the post disaster situation that is the focus of our work.
3
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2. The Role of the State and its Institutions in Dealing with Natural Disasters 
Most countries are ill-prepared for dealing with the traumatic and destructive consequences of 
disasters. This fact is true for both developed and less developed countries, but especially for less 
developed ones. Governments generally do not prioritise policies that prepare for potential 
natural disasters, and tend to respond only when circumstances force them into action. After a 
catastrophe, public and political attention focuses on the mitigation of damages as well as on 
supporting victims, who acquire a protagonistic role in the media. This interest in the disaster 
and its victims gradually declines in the period following the disaster and governments return to 
“politics as usual” until the next disaster happens (Birkland, 1996). 
This process also means that planning for potential disasters is often relegated to the backburner. 
This vicious circle is compounded by the fact that governments get little political credit for 
preventing a disaster. However, once a disaster occurs, political credit depends on how well a 
government responds to it (UN, 2002; Pelham et al. 2011). 
According to Vakis (2006), the institutional systems used to deal with disasters vary 
significantly, depending on the socio-economic and cultural contexts of each country. However, 
some common principles must be included, such as a permanent institution for risk management, 
which must exist prior to the occurrence of a disaster. In Chile, the relevant institution for this is 
the Oficina Nacional de Emergencias (National Agency for Emergencies, ONEMI), but the 
ONEMI does not have an established infrastructure for the management of all phases of the 
disaster cycle. The ONEMI is an agency with very limited resources, a limited capacity to 
coordinate risk prevention programs, and no institutional mandate to manage a reconstruction 
process.
4
 The ONEMI’s capacities concentrate principally on organising the emergency response 
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to natural disasters, but in this paper, we argue that its response to the emergency was extremely 
ad hoc.
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This is an important aspect of the disaster that must be analysed because low income households 
dispose of fewer means of their own for dealing with the consequences of a disaster. In general, 
these households are more inclined to reduce the consumption of basic goods such as food, 
health, and education after a catastrophe, which only ends up worsening their vulnerability. 
Vakis (2006) argues that a system of social protection must be considered as an integral part of 
any risk management strategy. In this context, a social protection system can be complementary 
to and synchronised with other emergency response mechanisms, as well as constituting a pre-
existing system, which can be adapted to the occurrence of unexpected natural disasters, and 
which has the capacity to coordinate efforts from the public, non-public, and private sector. Such 
a system must also be based on a system of analysis and information that allows policymakers to 
identify clearly the risks to which a particular population is subjected, as well as serving as part 
of a strategy that manages emergency situations. Along these lines, Pelham et al. (2011) suggest 
social safety nets that are integrated with the more general social protection system that should 
consist of unconditional transfers of goods or money, and are activated in the case of a natural 
disaster, especially to protect the most vulnerable households.  
In Chile, there are no protocols for dealing with post-disaster situations, so that the institutional 
response in each particular situation is designed by the respective government in office. The only 
risk management institution that exists is the ONEMI, but its lack of resources and political 
influence means that it has a limited operating capacity for dealing with large scale disasters, 
such as 27F. Many rural communities, located far away from urban centres therefore managed 
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the emergency situation on their own as the state was not capable of undertaking direct actions in 
their territories (Imilan et al. 2015) with the exception of some minimal microcredit programs for 
fishermen in the coastal areas.
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The principal tools through which the government allocated reconstruction aid was through a 
mechanism called the Ficha de Proteccion Social (the Social Protection Form, FPS), which is 
based on principles of targeted rather than universal benefits, and generally does not contemplate 
the option of cash transfers. The FPS is a central tool in the process of targeting spending on 
which the Chilean social protection system is based (Taylor, 2003). The origins of the FPS relate 
to the many ways in which Chile's neoliberal military regime reduced the role of the state, in part 
by privatising social security provisions. This eliminated any aspiration to establish universal 
social rights that previous governemts had (Borzutzky, 2002; Solimano, 2012; and Illanes and 
Riesco, 2007). The replacement of social security systems that shared risk among their 
beneficiaries with privatised systems and minimal state guarantees was accompanied by the 
concept of rigourous targeting: those individuals not covered by the new privatised social 
policies would receive a minimum level of benefit from the state
7
.  To determine whether an 
individual was eligible for a potential benefit, a local government official visited the household 
to undertake a survey of its general situation (e.g. the materials and quality of housing, whether a 
household possesses a television, refrigerator or telephone, and who is employed and the income 
level of the family), called a Ficha CAS, which would translate a household‟s level of need into a 
point score. Based on this score, benefits would be assigned, such as access to social housing, 
cash or in-kind benefits. 
Since 2007 the Ficha CAS has been replaced by a more modern version called the Ficha de 
Proteccion Social (the Social Protection Form, FPS), which takes into account a household‟s 
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capability to generate income (the number and age of family members, their educational level, 
and their employment situation) (Herrera et al., 2010). It was this instrument that was used for 
allocating social benefits during the reconstruction process following the 27F earthquake and 
tsunami.   
Whatever the criticisms of such a mechanism for targeting social policies may be (and there are 
many), a mechanism such as the FPS most certainly is not an appropriate tool for allocating 
benefits in the wake of a natural disaster. However, in the years following the 2010 earthquake, 
the FPS became one of the main social policy instruments used to deal with the consequences of 
the earthquake and tsunami. The problem with using this instrument is that it is insensitive to 
new conditions of vulnerability caused by the natural disaster. This problem became so evident 
during the post-27F context that the affected population immediately demanded its destitution as 
a policy-making instrument.
8
 However, in the absence of a social policy infrastructure 
specifically designed for dealing with the consequences of natural disasters, the government has 
to use established policy instruments for dealing with the reconstruction process, rather than 
experiment with new and untested policies. Bureaucrats in state agencies therefore never 
questioned the decision to apply policy tools designed for the allocation of social benefits under 
normal circumstances in a disaster situation.
9
 In fact, the only self-criticism that policymakers 
put forward during interviews and at public events with regard to the reconstruction process was 
that they had generated unrealistically high expectations among the population affected by the 
disaster by promising rapid and efficient solutions to housing problems, which they were then 
unable to deliver.
10
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3. The impact of the earthquake on well-being and the standard of living of 
the affected population 
Understanding both the long-term and short-term impact of the 2010 earthquake and tsunami on 
the affected regions in Chile has not been an easy task. Affected communities had a difficult time 
in the period immediately following the disaster with establishing precise statistics on the extent 
to which their material infrastructure (including private housing) had been damaged. Even more 
difficult was ascertaining the impact of the disaster on the labour market, on the population's 
health, or on education. As a result, different government agencies produced widely differing 
statistics on the damage caused by the earthquake, which in some cases were vastly inflated by 
the pressures exerted by local communities - who together with regional governments are 
responsible for applying the FPS - to declare the greatest possible extent of damage with the 
objective of obtaining the greatest possible share of reconstruction resources.  
In fact, both the data on the disaster‟s original damage as well as subsequent data on the 
reconstruction process were so confusing that the centre-left Bachelet administration, which 
assumed office in March of 2014 from the centre-right Piñera administration, had to commission 
a special delegate, who was then charged with preparing a report on the state of the 
reconstruction efforts, as well as with generating a new roadmap for the reconstruction process 
going forward.
 11
 The report concludes that “the official data available lack updating and correct 
referencing; the data is inconsistent, incomplete, and measurement standards differ within the 
same sector; multiple instruments exist that register damage, but that do not "converse" with 
each other, which results in differences between communal, regional, and national data that 
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surpass any fluctuations that could be explained through statistical error” (Ministry of Interior, 
2014). 
Given these statistical problems, we have used data from a specific survey, the Encuesta Post 
Terremoto (Post- earthquake Survey, EPT), which the Ministry of Social Development 
undertook in the regions of Valparaíso, Metropolitana, Libertador Bernardo O‟Higgins, Maule, 
Bíobío y Araucanía, to understand the extent of the social emergency that the earthquake and 
tsunami generated. The EPT gathered data during May and June of 2010 from 22.456 
households, which represents a subset of the sample surveyed by Chile's regular household 
survey, the Encuesta Casen (Casen survey) that had previously been applied in 2009. This makes 
the EPT a longitudinal survey with two applications, one in 2009 and another in 2010. The 
survey is representative both nationally and regionally, and it allows us to analyse how the well-
being of the population was affected by the earthquake and tsunami. Although well-being is a 
very broad concept, the survey includes many variables, including those pertaining to the 
concept of multidimensional poverty.  
According to the information gathered by the EPT, one of the most dramatic consequences of the 
earthquake was the damage to and destruction of housing. According to the EPT, approximately 
8.8% of the population living in the affected areas experienced either major damage or the 
complete destruction of their houses. In the three regions most affected by the earthquake, 
Libertador Bernardo O‟Higgins, Maule and Bíobío, the percentage of people affected was even 
greater at 17.3%. Predictably, the impact of the earthquake on the housing of low income 
households was the highest. On average, 12% of the households in the lowest income quintile 
lost their homes compared with 4.6% in the highest income quintile. The higher rate of damage 
among lower income households can partly be explained by the low quality and precariousness 
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of the housing itself, and partly can be attributed to the fact that they are built in areas that are 
subject to greater risk.  
Another area in which the post-earthquake household survey showed a significant impact is 
mental health. The survey incorporated the Davidson Trauma Scale that measures both the 
symptoms and the severity of post-traumatic stress disorder. Even three months after the 2010 
earthquake, 12% of the population in the affected regions (based on the percentage of people 
who responded to the service module on psychosocial impact) suffered symptoms associated 
with post-traumatic stress. This percentage was again much higher in the three regions most 
affected, where it varied between one fifth and one fourth of the population. Post-traumatic stress 
was also more prevalent among people from lower income households, either because they were 
more affected by the earthquake in terms of its material impact, or because they are less likely to 
be treated for the symptoms. The EPT survey also asked about people‟s health status in general, 
but the questions were so vaguely phrased that government reports ignored this dimension.
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The EPT also measured the effect of the earthquake and tsunami on the education of children in 
the affected regions. The beginning of the school year was delayed affecting 24.6% of 
schoolchildren, a proportion that increases to 70% in the three regions that were most affected 
(Libertador Bernardo O‟Higgins, Maule y Bíobío). Schools in these regions were relatively 
equally affected by the earthquake, regardless of whether they catered to high or low income 
households. 
If we look at the earthquake‟s effect on poverty levels, the EPT shows that between its two 
applications in 2009 and 2010, 10.5% of households fell below the poverty line while 7.4% rose 
above it. This generated a net increase in poverty at the national level from 16.4% to 19.4% 
13
. 
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Poverty is measured by means of an absolute measure of poverty that uses a monetary amount 
associated with a food basket that dates back to the late 80s. Monetary income below the 
equivalent of one food basket per person in the household is considered to constitute extreme 
poverty, while income below two food baskets per person constitutes absolute poverty.  
At the country level, the number of employed workers fell by 1.7% during this period. However, 
individual regional experiences were very different: The regions of Libertador B. O'Higgins and 
Biobio presented the most significant declines in employment, with negative figures of 10.2% 
and 5.7%, respectively. Instead, the Maule Region has a relatively smaller fall in employment of 
only 1.5%. Furthermore, the Araucanía Region exhibits a remarkable job growth of 8.2%. 
However, with regions individual communities were affected very differently. For example, in 
the Maule region, Constitución was one of the most affected towns together with Cauquenes and 
Pelluhue (ILO, 2010). Overall, the region lost 28.090 of which 87% were small businesses or 
self-employed workers. At the same time, earnings did not present great changes in the three 
most affected regions, mainly because of positive income growth among lower-skilled workers 
and negative growth among more skilled workers.   
 From this brief overview, we can see that the 27F earthquake and tsunami had a significant 
impact on many dimensions of the well-being of the population in the affected regions. First and 
foremost, was the material damage suffered in terms of housing and infrastructure (including 
hospitals and educational establishments). As the following section will illustrate, the 
government‟s social policies responded primarily to these issues. The significant effects of 
psychological stress were not – or were barely – addressed by public policies. As regards the loss 
of physical capital, there were, for example some minor programs including some small 
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microcredit programmes for fishermen, who had lost their boats, but the government mainly 
relied on the reconstruction effort itself to deal with the effects generated by the earthquake.
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4. Chile’s Social Policy Reponses to the Earthquake: The response of a 
neoliberal, subsidiary state in Constitución. 
The response of the Chilean State to 27F can be divided into two phases: the first was the 
immediate response to the earthquake (emergency reaction phase), and consisted principally of 
the distribution of emergency aid (water, food and fuel), as well as organising emergency 
housing shelters. The second phase began approximately one month after the earthquake and 
tsunami with the planning of reconstruction, which in the sphere of social policy dealt mainly 
with the allocation of subsidies for the rebuilding of housing.
15
  
To analyse the institutional response to the earthquake, we undertook fieldwork in the city of 
Constitución in the Maule region. Constitución is a small city with 37,000 inhabitants, of whom 
8.236 were directly affected by the earthquake and tsunami (MINVU, 2011).  
Despite the fact that people in Chile are generally quite well-informed about basic emergency 
protocols, the scale of the 2010 earthquake and tsunami was nevertheless unexpected, and the 
country proved to be ill-prepared in terms of its capacity to respond to its immediate 
consequences. Due to the interruption of communications during the hours following the 
disaster, the initial public response to the earthquake was both ad hoc and chaotic (Imilan et al, 
2015).  
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Municipal and local officials of Constitución state that they were not equipped to provide help in 
any systematic way and had to respond to the crisis spontaneously, prioritising the most urgent 
needs of the moment, so that during the first days people had to survive with their own and their 
community‟s limited resources. 
One resident of Constitución‟s Cerro O´Higgins, a low income neighborhood, which suffered 
extensive damage, stated that: “the earthquake was on the 27th February, the mayor and one 
person from the municipality showed up on the 30
th
. Although they knew from the beginning 
what had happened to us, because the next day they listed the people who had died. But nobody 
came from the municipality to ask us what we needed, how we were, nothing. They arrived on the 
30
th.”  (Resident of Cerro O`Higgins, interview, Constitución, 2013) 
It was in this context that neighbourhoods and communities spontaneously organised themselves 
collectively, and organized meetings to attend the most urgent needs of the community, such as 
finding accommodation for people who had lost their houses, obtaining food, water, and basic 
supplies, enforcing security in the neighbourhood, or organizing meetings with the local 
authorities in the hope of accelerating the assignation of subsidies (see Simon and Valenzuela, 
this issue for a more detailed discussion).  
"At first it was every day, every day we met in the morning, in fact this is how I got to be a 
community leader  ... where I felt more engaged, and began to talk about what could be done to 
fix things, what we were going to do, where… placing homeless people with the less afected 
neighbors, thinking about how to help children to cope with this situation." (Resident of Cerro 
O``Higgins, interview, Constitución, 2013) 
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In terms of social participation, the EPT shows that 21.9% of heads of households in the Maule 
region, and 36.9% in the Bíobío region implemented collective strategies to deal with the 
problems generated by the earthquake and tsunami. This social capital became a very relevant 
factor in the process that organised the emergency response to the earthquake. However, local 
governments did not have the ability to capitalise on this level of grassroots organization, nor to 
engage it in a sustained dialogue or program for action due to their lack of fiscal and human 
resources (Irazábal et al, 2015). In part, this inability reflects the fact that pre-and post-disaster 
planning is generally undertaken at the regional and central government level, and not in the 
municipalities, which have extremely diverse levels of human and fiscal capabilities.
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The absence of coherent protocols for action was also evident, as expressed by one official from 
the Ministry of Housing's office in the Maule region:  
 “That's why I'm saying, the subject of reconstruction, where we failed as a ministry and as a 
country … we don't have a protocol for this sort of stuff. Because sometimes the river floods, and 
everything  falls apart (queda la escoba), the volcano and everything  falls apart (queda la 
escoba), the tsunami and everything  falls apart (queda la escoba). I think that there is no 
protocol, so you have to act on the fly, and often acting on the hop takes a lot of time, because 
you have to start asking a lot of questions.” (Coordinator Housing reconstruction, Serviu, 
interview, Maule, 2013)  
This view is echoed by officials from the central government, who described a similar state of 
being overwhelmed: 
“I think that as a country we lack a logic of formal protocols. The whole thing worked on a case-
by-case basis. Almost like if there was a good relationship between the mayor of the moment and 
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the municipality’s housing staff with the regional or central government, then everything worked 
well. In other cases, if they didn't get on with whoever, then it didn't.” (Representative of the 
Ministry of Housing, interview, Santiago, May 2014) 
In general terms, the municipal administration was the institution that organised the emergency 
response to the disaster, while the central government and its regional agencies took on a more 
active role in the reconstruction process. The tasks of the municipal administration consisted of 
surveying the damage caused by the earthquake, distributing food and clothing, organising 
emergency housing, providing emotional support to neighbours, and even managing a makeshift 
morgue. The level of commitment of municipal officials in the emergency situation was highly 
valued, even when people described the lack of organisation in the response to the emergency 
during the first few days. The Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario (Department of Communal 
Development, DIDECO), Municipalidad de Constitución (Constitución Municipality) said:  
“Well, in reality, I could tell you about four or five functions that were clear, but at the same 
time they were also diffuse, because there was so much demand for everything and from 
everybody that things were difficult. For example, I can tell you specifically that during the first 
days even though I was in charge of education, the next day, I was in charge of the transitional 
morgue, or in charge of distributing water. I was also involved in distributing food. We ended up 
giving out 21,000 daily rations. …  I took on the job, I think, even though it didn't correspond to 
what I was supposed to be doing.”(Representative of DIDECO, interview, Constitución, 2013) 
The lack of coordination and direction meant that many resources received from NGOs and 
international organisations often did not correspond to the immediate needs of the population, or 
did not reach the population in a timely manner. The confusion and helplessness at the municipal 
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level was compounded by the fact that the earthquake occurred just two weeks before a change 
in government. Municipal officials complained that after the handover they lost their networks in 
the public administration: 
“Before the handover, you knew who to call. We all had networks that extended to other 
communities, and to the regional government. Even to people in Santiago. But when Piñera took 
over, everything changed. Many positions weren’t even filled. You didn't know who to call to get 
anything done. It was a mess. All new people. And they were clueless. You have no idea how this 
slowed things down.” (Municipal official in charge of planning, interview, Constitución, 2013)  
From the perspective of the inhabitants of Constitutión, the emergency efforts were 
uncoordinated, ineffective and basically chaotic. Once the emergency had been overcome, one of 
the most complicated policy issues was the selection of beneficiaries for the various 
reconstruction programs that were instituted, especially those related to housing destroyed by the 
earthquake and tsunami. This is where the discussion of targeted benefits in an emergency 
situation becomes very relevant as most of the programmes directed at the reconstruction of 
housing required the existence of an FPS, the household survey discussed in section 2 of this 
paper.  
The first problem with this system of allocation was that not every household affected by the 
earthquake also had an updated FPS. Yet one senior representative at the Ministry of Housing 
defended the use of the FPS by arguing that the majority of Chilean households have been 
interviewed for an FPS, so that this information was readily available:  
 “Many of these families didn't have an FPS, but the majority did. In Chile, there are about 5 
million households 3.8 million of which are covered by the FPS. If you look at this by quintile, 
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it's pretty obvious: the first quintile is almost fully fully covered by the FPS, almost 100%, and 
after that the proportion declines. In the fifth quintile it's pretty low. .... The FPS wasn't really a 
limitation, because in the cases where people didn't have it, we worked on a case by case basis. 
It wasn't a limiting factor for us in getting to lower middle-class or middle-class families who did 
not have the FPS.” (Representative of the Ministry of Housing, interview, Santiago, May 2014) 
 
In practical terms, families which had not applied for any form of state benefits or aid prior to the 
earthquake, had to overcome a series of obstacles to access reconstruction programs. A series of 
problems related to timing and information made the allocation of benefits more difficult. One 
employee from the municipal administration confirms:  
 “People would say: "I can't apply, I suffered damage but I was living with so-and-so", and 
that's where the problem happened with the FPS. They simply didn't have their own form. So 
they had no right or simply didn't go to the housing department so that they could analyse the 
state of their housing, and declare them inhabitable. From there you had to go to the SERPLAC 
(Regional Secretary for planning and coordination) so that they would emit a certificate of 
damage. So a lot of people didn’t know what to do. Then they went back to housing with a 
certificate of inhabitability, they'd come here and say: “look, here I have my certificate of 
inhabilitability, but I can't apply..., By then the application deadline had passed, and that's when 
they’d find out that they had to go to the SERPLAC” (Municipal official, interview, Constitución, 
2013). 
Knowledge and information about how the FPS system works was also unequally distributed 
among the population:  
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“… it was all completely disorganized. In the sector of La Poza17, people know the benefit 
system,.. So there were people who knew how this worked and they worked the system very well, 
but there were loads of people who had never in their life [applied for a benefit], who've always 
worked and have always bought stuff with their own efforts who didn't know anything. So they 
were abandoned” (Local coordinator of the MNRJ-Movimiento por una Reconstrucción Justa, 
Movement for a fair reconstruction, Interview, Constitución, 2013). 
The fair allocation of the benefits was questioned by many residents of Constitución. One 
woman from Villa Verde, a middle class neighborhood, for example, said:  
“For example there are lots of people who were left out, I know of two women, who are the same 
as me. They live off their wage and nothing else. And here you see quite a few people who have 
two cars. Here in our little street, my neighbours have two tremendous cars, stupendous. That is, 
you can tell they're not for this kind of housing, so how the hell did they end up here? She's a 
policewoman. I don't know how much a policewoman earns, she's really well off, and everyone 
looks at her thinking mmmm.”(Resident of Villa Verde, Interview, Constitución, 2013) 
However, in addition to the problems relating to fairness of allocation, other problems emerged 
that derive from the application of a public policy tool designed for normal circumstances in the 
context of a post-disaster reconstruction process. The FPS is an instrument that is applied by 
municipalities at the local level. Municipal administrations tended to inflate the damage that their 
communities had incurred, as this would increase the funds they would receive from the central 
government for reconstruction. Municipal administrations would then use these funds to obtain 
political support from their voters, thus engaging in clientilistic politics that would exacerbate the 
lack of transparency and fairness in the allocation of funds. 
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This qualitative appreciation of the allocation of funding coincides perfectly with the more 
rigourous analysis carried out on this topic by the Delegación Presidencial para la 
Reconstrucción (Presidential Delegation for Reconstruction), which concluded: "the FPS became 
the main gateway through which beneficiaries could go to obtain support. In this context, 
innumerable reports from the affected population highlight the lack of rigour in its application. 
This situation has been recognised by the current government." (Delegación Presidencial, 2014) 
In addition, the circumstances of families change abruptly as a result of such a natural disaster. 
Because the FPS could not measure the complexity of this change in circumstances, the 
government decided to freeze point scores obtained through the FPS and maintain them at pre-
earthquake levels.
18
 
Another weakness that must be mentioned in the context of the Chilean earthquake and tsunami 
is the lack of coordination between those institutions dealing with its impact, as well as the lack 
of empowerment of local institutions, both in terms of their actual capacities (quantity and 
professionialism of their staff) as well as their capability to make independent decisions (Mella, 
2011). As discussed above, this process was compounded by the change of government that 
ocurred only a few days after the emergency. 
The second phase phase of the reconstruction in Constitución was initiated with the formulation 
of the Plan de Reconstrucción Sustentable (Sustainable Reconstruction Plan). The formulation of 
this plan was funded by Celulosa Arauco (Arauco Cellulose), which is one of the main forestry 
conglomerates in the Bío Bío region. Arauco hired architecture and public relations firms to 
establish a plan, which was to guide the territorial reconstruction of Constitución, as has been 
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documented in detail by Tironi (2014) and Irazábal et al (2015). The government then funded the 
necessary investment in reconstruction itself (Ministerio del Interior, 2014).
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The support by Arauco was highly valued by the residents but also originated some conflicts. A 
piece of land was donated by the company under the condition that half of the houses built had to 
be for Arauco employees affected by the catastrophe, and the other half could be distributed 
among the rest of the neighbours. The difference between Arauco workers and the rest of the 
inhabitants generated a series of problems of coexistence. Some local residents were sceptical of 
the company's motives, which they considered to be a form of "image laundering" by a firm that 
had "ruined a once fine seaside resort”and caused widespread environmental devastation in the 
area (Tironi, 2014). In our interviews, one community leader argued: 
“Yes, Arauco is mixed up in all this. … If you look carefully, there are lots of things where 
Arauco has invested money, like in the football field … that was built by Arauco who then gave it 
to the municipality. They're building a cultural centre, Arauco is also in on that one. They will 
begin to build a library, also Arauco. So there's a lot of stuff where Arauco is involved…. But in 
reality what they're interested in is the road, in expanding the road, making it wider for the 
transport of wood. We all know that that's the reality. Arauco’s involved in that too." 
(Community leader, interview,Constitución, 2013) 
Other private or non–governmental organisations also participated in the reconstruction process 
and filled gaps in the public provision of goods. However, these entities acted independently, 
mostly without linking their actions to the Master Plan, which offered quick solutions for 
specific problems.
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 Private organizations in general had the ability to respond quickly and 
appropriately to the most pressing population needs, as opposed to the Government where the 
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processes were delayed by bureaucracy and inefficiencies. One municipal official from 
Constituciòn, for example, described his contact with the head of the foundation Levantemos 
Chile (Rebuild Chile) as follows:
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“After a few telephone calls, I got hold of his number, I called him [Felipe Cubillos] quite a few 
times, like 11 times, he answered. That's when I met him, we greeted each other and he said: 
“Which school was destroyed?” We went to see the school, which is the Enrique Donn School, 
and he said to me: “And where do we put a modular school?” And we went to the place, and 
after half an hour he said: “Okay this is where we put the modular school.” … Much quicker, 
that is, imagine, in half an hour and he decided all these things…. And after that it's a well-
known story. On 27 April, if I remember correctly, around that time they inaugurated the 
modular school, with a capacity for 1000 students, because Felipe understood that if the the 
children had a place to go to, where they could eat and be looked after during the whole day, it 
would give parents the chance to rebuild their house, get rid of the debris etc etc.” (Municipal 
Official, interview, Constitución, 2013) 
The qualitative evidence presented in this section illustrates the extent to which the precarious 
institutional capacity of Chile's municipal administrations was overwhelmed by the 2010 
earthquake and tsunami. Municipalities lacked administrative protocols for dealing with post 
emergency situations, they lacked the capacity to execute reconstruction efforts, and they could 
not take advantage of local NGOs, private donors, and organised citizen groups who were 
operating in the area of Constitución at the time because they lacked both the resources and 
expertise to coordinate their activities. In addition, having to rely on the same social policy tools 
that are applied under normal circumstances in a disaster situation (the FPS) proved to be 
extremely complicated and ineffective. As a result, even though the reconstruction plan for 
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Constitución had an integrated vision for the reconstruction of the territory, the majority of this 
plan was not executed (Irazábal et al., 2015). 
 
6. Conclusions  
Chile is very well prepared for natural disasters in terms of preventing material damage. The 
establishment and effective enforcement of appropriate earthquake resistant building codes 
illustrates the strength of Chile‟s institutions for regulating and enforcing legislation when 
political will and attention is directed towards a particular issue. This is a very important 
conclusion as the policies that prevent material damage save lives and also contain the social 
emergencies that follow a natural disaster. However, the country is much less well prepared for 
dealing with the effects of a disaster, both in terms of the first phase of the post-disaster 
emergency response, and in terms of the second phase of long-term reconstruction. 
Administrative decentralisation for the post-disaster response has now been shown to be 
inefficient. The way in which local institutions coped with the earthquake and the subsequent 
reconstruction process illustrate that they are ill-equipped for dealing with an emergency at the 
local and regional level as they are not empowered to act independently from the central 
government, and also lack independent resources.  The complications generated by a change in 
the central and regional governments during the period immediately following the earthquake 
further illustrate the need for a permanent and independent civil service structure. At present 
civil servants in leading positions at all levels of government, but even more particularly so at the 
local and regional level, are appointed according to political criteria, and often also according to 
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the role they played in the most recent local elections, rather than according to their actual 
capacities and administrative experience and capability (Sehnbruch and Siavelis, 2014).  
Second, the fact that the state used established mechanisms for benefit allocation in those social 
policy areas where it did intervene points to a lack of institutional capacity and planning for 
social emergencies. In particular, this logic ignores the fact that not only the poor are vulnerable 
in a natural disaster situation. Higher income groups, in particular Chile‟s emerging middle class, 
are equally vulnerable. Yet the targeted approach to reconstruction benefits by definition 
excludes the middle class. That public officials did not question the logic of targeting resources 
in a post-disaster situation shows that this logic is deeply ingrained in Chile's institutional 
framework. This also explains why the Chilean state has not established an alternative regime for 
allocating social benefits in an emergency situation.  
Third, the expansion of the engagement of the private sector through public-private alliances, 
such as the reconstruction plan for Constitución, also showed up the limitations imposed by a 
lack of clear institutional structure. The reconstruction initiative was not sustainable (financially 
or in terms of human resources), and therefore ended up as a failed attempt to involve a private 
business in the functions of the State.  
So although the Chilean State has had the capacity to enforce strict earthquake resistant building 
codes, it has never had the capability to deal adequately with the reconstruction process that must 
follow a disaster. While we are dealing with an atrophied State that was born out of a neoliberal 
legacy, we are also dealing with a modern state that has not invested adequately in its own 
development. The expectations of the Chilean population therefore significantly outpaced the 
capabilities of the Chilean State.
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A future social policy infrastructure for natural disasters should consider the recommendations 
made by the international literature, which as a first emergency response suggests establishing 
cash transfers for victims of natural disasters that can be disembursed rapidly based on damage 
suffered by a particular town or geographical area. A second level of institutional response must 
focus on preventing poverty and falls in the employment participation rate. This means 
organising the reconstruction effort with labour force participation in mind, and not simply 
leaving the allocation of jobs to the markets, which particularly affects women, who often leave 
the labour force following an emergency situation and do not want to work in reconstruction. 
Procedures for reconstruction grants and loans should also be simplified: a single certificate of 
damage should automatically entitle households to benefits rather that the endless bureaucratic 
procedures that currently characterise this process. 
In terms of the resulting outcomes of these social policy mechanisms, government indicators 
show that by 2014 90% of lost housing infrastructure was been rebuilt or repaired in the affected 
regions.
23
 However, the evidence also shows that the application of the three principles of social 
policy in Chile - targeting, decentralisation and privatisation - result in profoundly flawed 
allocation mechanisms in the context of post-disaster emergency and reconstruction processes. In 
Chile, disasters happen on a regular basis, so that it is extremely necessary to design and 
implement institutions that are equipped to deal with catastrophic events. 
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A note on the fieldwork undertaken for this paper  
The interviews for this paper were undertaken in the city of Constitución (VII region, El Maule), 
which was selected because of the extent of the damage that the city experienced as a result of 
both the earthquake and tsunami due to its coastal location. Most of these interviews were carried 
out in Constitución itself during 2013 by the Observatorio de la Reconstrucción (Observatory of 
the Reconstruction) established by the University of Chile.   
Interviewee Number Location Date 
Interview of housing ministry representative 
with a high level of responsibility   
1 Santiago Mayo, 2014 
Interview of research are specialised on the 
subjects of Reconstruction and urban planning  
1 Santiago Mayo, 2014 
Interviews with neighbours and community 
leaders 
11 Constitución 2013 
Interviews with representatives from the 
municipal administration  
2 Constitución 2013 
Interviews with representatives from regional 
government agencies (SERVIU, SERPLAC) 
2 Constitución 2013 
Interview with representative of a large 
company in the region  
1 Constitución 2013 
TOTAL 18 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 This change in the targeting criteria was due to the findings of a longitudinal survey (Casen 1996-2001) which 
showed that although only 13% of the population fell under the official poverty line, while 40% of households were 
vulnerable and had at some point fallen under the poverty line. A description of the policy instrument used to define 
who is poor and eligible for a subsidy can be found in Herrera et al. (2010). 
2
 Details on the interviews and focus groups carried out can be found at the end of the bibliography. They were 
carried out during August and September 2013 by members of the Observatorio de la Reconstrucción (Observatory 
of the reconstruction) and the Centro de Investigación de Vulnerabilidades y Desastres Socionaturales ( Research 
Centre on vulnebability and socio-natural disasters, CIVDES) both at the Universidad de Chile (University of 
Chile). The principal objective of the fieldwork was to reconstruct the emergency response and reconstruction 
process that followed the earthquake in the city of Constitución, to identify critical junctures in these processes, as 
well is experiences of collaboration and conflict within the city. 
3
 For a more detailed discussion of the role of the private sector in responding to social needs following the 
earthquake, see Imilan et al. and Arana articles in this issue. 
4
 See Vargas (2002) for recommendations on the different stages of risk prevention. 
5
 Historically, the Corporación de Fomento y Reconstrucción (Chilean Economic Development Agency, CORFO) 
was charged with in reconstruction issues after the 1939 Chillán earthquake. However, CORFO‟s mission has since 
expanded to broader development issues, which has led to the neglect of reconstruction policies. 
6 The program “Return to the Sea” (Volvamos a la mar) that was designed to help local fishermen had a very limited 
impact. According to official reports, the maximum subsidy that was received by 67 beneficiaries was 2.100.00 
Chilean Pesos (Approximately 3.500 USD at the time), depending on the damage incurred by individual fishermen. 
The subsidy was designed to help them replace their boats, engines and fishing equipment, and covered between 
25% and 50% of the total cost of the required fishing equipment. Equipment that fishermen required that was not 
covered by the subsidy had to be acquired either through personal funds or bank loans (Imilan and Fuster, 2013). 
Official statistics show that between 2010 and 2011, the total amount of active fishing boats declined for the first 
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time since 2004  by 19.7% (Contreras and Winckler, 2013).    
7
 In addition to being targeted, these benefits were also restricted in their number, which created a system of cupos 
(roughly translated as a quota). Potential beneficiaries had to apply for benefits and would be put on a waiting list to 
receive them. If a cupo did not become available for them, they would not receive the benefit, thus waiting 
indefinitely. 
8
 For more information on this debate, see Pulgar (2014). 
9
 This issue is discussed in detail by Atria et al. (2013). One example that the book gives is the fact that when 
policymakers began to think about reforming Santiago‟s bus system (which later became known as Transantiago), 
they did not even consider the possibility of establishing a public transportation system, but instead worked with a 
fragmented private system in which multiple providers need to be regulated and monitored.  It is hard to see how the 
city-wide transportation system can be considered a “private issue” Rather it is a public issue given a privatized 
solution. 
10
 This statement is based on a presentation made by the Subsecretaría de Vivienda (Undersectary of Housing), 
Andrés Iacobelli, on the 27
th
 November 2012 during the third session of the Plataforma Regional para la Reducción 
de Desastres en Las Amércias (Regional Platform for the Reduction of Natural Disasters in the Americas, UNISDR) 
in Santiago. On 25th September 2013, Andres Gil Santa Cruz, at the time the Coordinator of the National 
Reconstruction Programme, during a debate at the Universidad de Los Andes (Los Andes University), made the 
same point. Neither of the two representatives of the government at the time in any way questioned the use of 
normal policy tools during a post-disaster situation. 
11
 Paula Forttes, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, was named the special presidential delegate for 
undertaking a comprehensive study of the reconstruction process. 
12 Although Sanhueza et al (2011) found that the earthquake and tsunami particularly affected the health of the older 
population. 
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13 Sanhueza, Contreras y Denis (2011) analysed the effects of the earthquake based on a difference on difference 
methodology for five dimesions of well-being: education, health, housing, income an employment. They used the 
Alkire and Foster (2007) methodology to construct an aggregate indicator of multidimensional poverty focused on 
specific age groups (children, adults and the elderly). They found that the earthquake negatively affects children in 
terms of the aggregate multidimensional poverty levels of households, while older people are affected in the 
dimension of health. 
14
 Issues of post-traumatic stress, even though the data shows that this is where the earthquake had a significant 
impact, were not addressed in any way by specific public policies. 
15
 The Chilean state also had to deal with organising the re-establishment of schools and hospitals 
during this time. This process, however, was dealt with by the Ministries of Education and 
Health and did not use the same mechanisms of social policy allocation as we discuss in this 
paper. 
16
 The fragile state of Chile municipal administrations in terms of their limited human and fiscal resources can be 
explained by the fact that the Chilean central government, following a neoliberal logic, does very little to redistribute 
resources between rich and poor municipalities. Although there is a fund for such redistribution, Fondo Comun 
Municipal (Commonal Municipal Fund), its redistributive abilities are extremely limited so that individual 
municipalities have to rely on the taxes that they themselves can raise. Wealthy municipalities with high income 
households and a higher density of economic activities therefore end up being very wealthy, while poor 
municipalities with little economic activity remain poor (Valenzuela, 2012). 
17
 La Poza is a historic borough of Constitución where local fishermen live 
18
 See: http://www.eldinamo.cl/2012/01/24/ficha-de-proteccio/ and http://www.biobiochile.cl/2011/04/30/fps-
mideplan-congela-puntajes-y-conserva-indices-previos-al-terremoto.shtml 
19
 The role of the private sector in the reconstruction process was highly controversial: while residents valued the 
greater efficiency of the private sector, they also recognised that local companies used the reconstruction process to 
shore up or launder their corporate image. For a more detailed discussion of the interaction between public and 
private sector, see Tironi (2014), Arana (2016, this issue), and Imilan et al. (2016, this issue). 
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20
 In July 2010, the Chilean government established the Fondo Nacional de Reconstrucción (National 
Reconstruction Fund, FNR), Law number 20.444, which brought together all private donations to the reconstruction 
effort that would tax deductible. The fund was administered by the Ministry of Finance, independently of the master 
plans that were being elaborated, as every donor could specify where they wanted the money to be spent. In 
Constitución, a total of 16 projects were financed by this fund to pay for investments in equipment and 
infrastructure, but only one of these was linked to the city's master plan (Imilan et al., 2015).  
2015 “Post-disaster reconstruction without citizens and their social capital in Llico, Chile”. Environment and 
Urbanization, 27(1), 1-1 
21
 The foundation Levantemos Chile, (Rebuild Chile) is a private NGO that was founded during the time following 
the earthquake with intention of supporting local communities affected by the tsunami. It was headed by the 
businessman Felipe Cubillos, who tragically died in an airplane crash in 2011 while on his way to visits 
reconstruction efforts on the island Juan Fernandez in the Pacific Ocean, together with all other 20 passengers on 
board the plane. 
22
 We propose to insert an analysis of the current institutional changes being proposed here as soon as the final 
legislation has been submitted. Current political discussions show that the arguments presented in this paper have 
been taken into account by the current Bachelet administration and the new legislation will address many of the 
institutional criticisms that we make in this paper.  
23
 Only in remote rural areas was the reconstruction process still incomplete 
